Labour’s Brexit Strategy: Cut-&-Paste of Theresa May’s old promises?

This week, Labour revealed its Brexit strategy – Jack Brooks takes a closer look.

In the 10 months after the 23rd of June, the Labour party’s position on Brexit and what should happen next has been a bit… ‘undefined’ to say the least. They have been in an incredibly tough position of simultaneously wanting to appeal to the 63% of its voters that voted remain and not start any rebellions within the 218 out of 232 MPs that publicly supported remain, while also wanting to appeal to the 37% of its voters, 161 Labour held constituencies that voted leave and not hemorrhage any more of its working class support, a demographic that predominantly voted leave.

Having considered the above, it appears that Labour party HQ decided that their best course of action was to a) keep their head down, b) meekly try to appeal to both sides, while not really saying anything concrete, but c) mainly just oppose the government by saying. Of course, Labour was dealt a tough hand and this is a solid electoral strategy that, on the issue of the financial crash, saw the Liberal democrats sweep to 23% of the popular vote in 2010.

But then, like a renowned bandit brazenly slamming open the shutter doors to a sleepy Mid-western Saloon, Theresa May called a snap General election. The music stopped playing, everyone went silent and slowly turned their heads to the Sheriff who loudly gulped and realised it was his turn to say something… Sherriff Jeremy Corbyn was taken slightly aback and thus came out with a strategy that, with a few key differences, is basically the same plan the Conservative Government had in November.

First, let me know the few key differences:

  • Labour will not focus on new markets, instead focus on securing the UK’s existing trade ties, especially those with the EU
  • Labour will adopt a much more conciliatory tone with the EU27 in exit talks
  • Labour resolutely supports staying in: Erasmus, Euratom, the European Medical Agency, Europol & Eurojust
  • Labour promises to unilaterally protect EU citizens’ right to remain in the UK
  • Labour commits to not let the UK “lag behind EU in workplace protections or environmental standards in future”

These are a couple of added giveaways to Remainers that will certainly sweeten the Brexit blow for them, but in terms of the “real meat” of the last 10 months debate so far – ‘Hard Brexit versus Soft Brexit versus No Brexit – their position is the now infamous “having the cake and eat it too”-Brexit.

This is illustrated by statements by Keir Starmer in the same press conference on Tuesday:

  • He wants to rip up the Government White Paper and go for a “tariff-free trade with the EU, no new non-tariff barriers on trade, regulatory alignment and continued competitiveness in goods and services.”
  • However, he still rules out continued free movement, membership of the European Free trade area and Single market membership.

As Theresa May discovered to her dismay in January, these two things are incompatible as far as the European Union is concerned. When she proposed it as her plan, the EU27 said for all intent and purposes “We won’t agree with that and you will crash out with no deal”. An eventuality that Starmer said would be the “worst possible deal”.

Electorally, the Labour Brexit plan might make sense. Labour continues to (try to) appeal to both sides and win the election. Corbyn and his party will only need to deal with untangling the contradictory manifesto commitments after they have won.  Also why look a gift horse in the mouth? The blessing of being the opposition with staggeringly bad polling is that you don’t have to live in the bounds of reality (which is quite a lot of effort in any case). Nevertheless, if we do experience the largest polling mistake in modern history and Labour wins a majority, we need to expect a lot of back-paddling.

Jack Brooks is a 2016 Politics and International Relations Honours Graduate of Canterbury Christ Church University and graduate coordinator at the Centre for European Studies (CEFEUS) at CCCU.

Theresa May’s Three-Way Brexit Fight – And Why She Cannot Win

On the 29th of March 2017, the government of the United Kingdom officially informed the President of the European Council about their intention to leave the European Union within the next two years. This so-called triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union will start a process, which will be complex with many unknown and unforeseen developments, challenges and problems on the way.

Theresa May has made it clear that she wants the UK’s departure from the EU to strengthen the Union, to improve the lives of British people and to work for both the UK and the EU.  However, this seems more and more unlikely. The Prime Minister, and her negotiation team are not just fighting a one-way battle with the EU-negotiation team about the terms of Brexit and a successor agreement that will give the UK access to the European market, they are actually involved in a three-way fight. A fight that is full of contradictions and centrifugal forces, and one that Theresa May cannot win.

Fight Number 1: The European Dimension

The UK government will spend the next two years negotiating with an EU delegation on the terms of Brexit. Some of the negotiations will be relatively simple, such as on air traffic rules and even the rights of EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU will be secured relatively quickly as there are no major obstacles on a solution for these issues on either side. Other issues, such as which access the UK will get to the European single market, the size of the final bill that the UK will have to pay and the future of free movement will be much tougher. The European Parliament has already announced that they will veto any deal that will phase out free movement early, and countries in Eastern Europe will likely veto anything that will affect financial contributions promised to them in years to come. There is still an ongoing debate about whether no deal would be a good deal. However, the complexity of reaching a deal becomes obvious when one thinks about the key priorities for the European side. There are three priorities the EU negotiators will focus on. First, the rights of EU citizens in the UK. This will be secured relatively quickly as it just needs an insurance that Brits in the EU will treated the same way. Second, the final bill the UK has to pay before leaving, for example for pension contributions to British staff that served in the Commission. Here agreement will be hard to find and a lot will depend on Germany as the now even bigger contributor to the EU to pick up some of the bill and give the UK a “better” deal. However, the third key priority for EU negotiators and linked to a trade deal with the UK, is the issue of demonstrating that leaving the European Union has serious consequences. Many saw Brexit as a first step to the EU falling apart. Germany, France, and most countries in Eastern Europe will want to prevent any impression that this is the case and that a country can leave the EU, stop paying into the budget but still enjoy all the benefits. The Germans particularly will want to set an example and Angela Merkel has announced this immediately after the Brexit vote. So, it is by no way clear that there will be a deal, and what kind of deal it will be.

© stuart anthony via

Fight Number 2: The Home Front

On the 28th of March 2017, the Scottish Parliament voted in favour of a new referendum on independence. This vote, a day before the triggering of Article 50 by the British Prime Minister, will set the tone for months and indeed years to come. While the UK government has dismissed the Scottish request for a second referendum within a decade, it will not be able to uphold this ignorance for long. Scottish people might not (yet) be convinced that independence is the better option, but most of them are convinced that Scotland should have the choice and that the UK government should not decide on Scotland’s future. There is a good chance that by the time Scotland will have a second referendum on independence (and this is just a question of time), there might be a majority for independence. In addition to the constitutional crisis in regards to Scotland, Brexit has also opened up old wounds in Northern Ireland, with Sein Fein using the topic to mobilise support for a referendum on the unification of the Irish island. The potential of a hard border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland might create new potential for conflict, but most importantly it will create huge disturbances for people and businesses on both sides of the border. In light of this, who knows, maybe the people in Northern Ireland can easier live with a united Ireland than a new hard border.

Finally, the business community in the UK will put pressure on the government to ensure access to the European market, or in case this cannot be received, to receive special deals. A special deal has already been agreed for Nissan, it is hard to see why other car manufacturers in the UK will not demand the same terms of a deal from the government.

With a constitutional crisis fully evolving, a fragile economy that has to be preparing for the worst, and many regions, Councils and communities in the UK expecting whatever affect the Brexit deal will have on them, it is hard to see how the government will be able to deal with all of these competing and in some cases contradicting demands and find a solution that everyone can live with.

Fight Number 3: The International Dimension

Finally, Brexit will force the UK government to think about the UK’s international role. This of course offers a lot of opportunities. However, in reality that international environment is about as hostile as it could be to the UK as a new actor in trade and world influence. In the USA, President Trump is about to divide his country and the international community with it. In Russia, President Putin is probing the patience of NATO. In China, the Communist Party, while formally committed to free markets, is preparing for a more competitive and protectionist era in world trade. At the same time, the UK will only be allowed to formally negotiate trade deals once it has left the European Union (until then, this remains a competence of the EU Commission). While trade deals with some countries will be signed relatively quickly, especially trade deals with the major UK markets outside of Europe (such as the US, Canada, Australia, India, etc.) will take years to negotiate. Even if trade agreements can be negotiated, even if the time span is shorter than expected, it is nevertheless hard to see how the current international environment and the limited ability and experience that the UK government has to negotiate new deals will not have an impact economically, politically and socially.

It Burns, Burns, Burns – The Ring of Fire

Brexit is the result of an ill-informed and unnecessary referendum. The British people will now have to live with the consequences. However, as has been demonstrated above, there are at least three major fights the government has at its hands in order to make any Brexit deal work and ensure a better future post-Brexit. The centrifugal forces that will hit the UK, the economic impact of the Brexit negotiations, and the future development of the international system will all have substantial impacts on the UK in the near future. Even if the UK had the best negotiators in the world (and it does not), even if Europeans wanted to give the UK a good deal (and they do not), even if the international environment was more receptive and positive (and it is not), even if all of these circumstances were met, it would still be hard to see how Theresa May and the UK government can win the fight on all these three fronts. What has happened is that in recent months more and more fires were lit by the government and fire does, what fire does – it spreads and grows out of control. Eventually, it burns.

Dr Soeren Keil is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University.

Can Money buy (E)U citizenship? Presentation by Dr Jelena Dzankic, European University Institute – 9 November, 6PM

Public event on Wednesday 9th November at 6pm in LG16 (Laud) at Canterbury Christ Church University

The spread of the global economic crisis enticed many countries to consider attracting investors to become their citizens. The mushrooming of investor programs, which permit rich individuals to gain residence in the underlying countries and eventually access their citizenship, has become a mechanism of securing an infusion of capital into the struggling economies. The lecture will first look at the relationship between the notion of citizenship and the different types of preferential naturalization of investors: naturalization through residence, discretionary naturalization, and detailed investor citizenship programs. In order to examine whether the economic utility of the investment to the state can suffice to override some or all other criteria for naturalization, we will explore legal and normative dimensions of the notion of “genuine ties” questioning whether preferential treatment of investors can be justified as merit or talent. In the second part of the lecture, the focus will be on classifying investment-based citizenship and residence programs in all the 28 European Union (EU) Member States, and on discussing the implications of investor citizenship and residence programs on the notion of EU citizenship.

jelena-dzankicDr Jelena Dzankic currently coordinates the European Citizenship Observatory (EUDO) at the European University Institute in Florence. She holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge and before moving to Florence has worked as a research fellow in the CITSEE (Citizenship in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia) project at the University of Edinburgh. Her book titled “Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro” was published with Ashgate in 2015. She is currently working on an edited volume titled “The Europeanization of the Western Balkans” forthcoming with Palgrave MacMillian in 2017 (with Marko Kmezic and Soeren Keil). She has worked as an adviser to the European Commission and numerous NGOs including Freedom House. 

Boris Makes his Move

By Dr Mark Bennister

And so to watch Boris in action at City Hall. By chance I was there to see how questioning the Mayor works as part of a wider research project on prime ministerial accountability to the legislature. Of course this was the morning after the night before and it’s all about Boris and Europe. The Mayor’s Question Time was supposed to be about the budget, but Boris – and to be fair several assembly members – was determined to make it all about the EU.


Photo By Andrew Parsons/ i-Images

Continue reading “Boris Makes his Move”

How a Brexit Would Influence the British Economy, Part 2: The Insurance and Manufacturing Sector

A Four-Part Brexit Blog, hosted by CCCU Politics/IR Jean Monnet Chair in European Foreign Affairs, Dr Amelia Hadfield.

Featuring: guest Jean Monnet Scholar Mechthild Herzog.

Part 2: Who’s Afraid of Leaving? The Insurance and Manufacturing Sector

Guest blogger Mechthild Herzog
Guest blogger Mechthild Herzog

In Part 1 of our 4-part series, “If Britain Leaves the EU, We Leave Britain”, we explored the potential impact on the finance sector of the British referendum, forecasted for late 2016. In this second instalment, we dig a little deeper, enquiring into changes that could feasibly affect the insurance and manufacturing sectors.

The UK Insurance Sector: the ultimate uninsurable

Based on our overview of key players, the insurance industry perceives itself to be considerably threatened by a potential Brexit, largely because current predictions indicate that it is likely to suffer not only short-term disruptions, but also permanent, and fragmenting ones. Unsurprisingly, the majority of representatives from the insurance sector strongly advocate the UK remaining an EU member. Gerry Grimstone, chairman of the Edinburgh-headquartered insurer Standard Life, sets the tone in this respect, describing a Brexit as “disastrous for London and the UK”.[1]

Looking more closely at the details, British insurance companies may not be as exposed to high risks of negative impact as the financial sector, or the chemical and automotive industries. However, as argued by Open Europe, a Brexit could weaken prospects either to maintain, or to re-build, the currently strong position of British insurance companies, as they would be unable to sell their policies in Europe for the same pre-Brexit prices and conditions. The change entailed in post-Brexit conditions would also deter overseas players from opening offices in the UK. Insurers, themselves in the business of rendering risk preventative find themselves ironically in a particularly precarious position in which the risk to the overall sector remains at present fundamentally unmanageable.  As a recent Reuters article suggested, the impact could affect not only current business strategies, but the loss of years of work on a common regulatory framework, including agreements on the amount of capital EU insurers require to establish and operate their businesses.[2] Continue reading “How a Brexit Would Influence the British Economy, Part 2: The Insurance and Manufacturing Sector”