#GE2017 and Brexit – Traincrash vs lucky escape

Unless you’ve been living under a rock or, god forbid, without adequate WIFI for the last day, you will be aware that we are having a snap election in just over 7 weeks’ time on the 8th of June. While seemingly the entirety of the UK population is preoccupying itself by venting their joy and frustration into the bottomless void of Twitter, I would like to take a moment to talk about Brexit and what this means for the upcoming negotiations.

In the short term, it means kicking the can down the road, but fortunately snap elections are… well, snappy. It seems highly unlikely we are going to hear anything major out of the Government over the next 7 weeks, not least because Parliament will be dissolving in 2 weeks time, the pre-election ‘Purdah’ will be kicking in any moment and the Prime Minister is going to be spending most of her time staging awkward photo-ops with nursery children.

My one word of warning, however, is that this ‘Article 50 Road’ is not very long and we are already going to spend the best part of 6 months of it with the French and German elections. Using these potentially crucial, if short, 7 weeks before the German elections start in earnest messing around with our own election might come back to bite us when we are scrambling to get a deal, transitional or not, in 2019.

But on the other side of the channel, the EU27 have an interesting opportunity to throw a spanner in the works if they so wish, as there is a European Council meeting on the 29th of April. Whether or not they will is a speculation too far for this graduate coordinator, but if they believed they might get a better deal out of Jeremy Corbyn than Theresa May, or fancied a 28th member in the form of an independent Scotland, or if they just wanted to make life difficult for Theresa May by pulling a lever or two and forcing her into some manifesto pledges, now is the time for Donald Tusk to start honing his spanner-throwing skills.

With a longer term view, I muse two possible alternatives;

The first and, YouGov willing, much more likely outcome of this election is that May doesn’t have any moving vans arriving outside of No.10. If she wins, it seems fairly likely that the UK negotiating position will stay more or less the same: No European Court of Justice, No Single Market, No Customs union, but with a Free Trade Area and some form of customs agreement that allows for minimal non-tariff barriers, and a hard border in Dover but a soft one in Northern Ireland. Indeed, if as seems most likely she increases the Conservative majority in House of Commons she will treat this as a cast-iron validation of her Brexit strategy. Alongside this the EU27 position is unlikely to change much either unless there is the arrival of the aforementioned spanners.

I suppose there is a chance she has some electoral difficulties: perhaps she becomes concerned about her ‘Brexity’ base being tempted to UKIP or her ‘Remoany’ base being tempted by the Lib-Dems, and is forced into changing the Brexit strategy to appease an aspect of her coalition, but given her batting average of 46% vote share in the most recent Comres poll, this doesn’t seem that likely.

The second and, Ipsos willing, much less likely outcome is that Theresa May cannot achieve a majority. This alternative would be very chaotic and a massive upset to the Article 50 process will ensue. The polls seem to suggest Corbyn has a snowman’s chance in hell of actually getting a majority. So this alternative looks something like a Lib/Lab/SNP coalition or Con/Lib coalition…. here are two Buster Keaton GIFs as to what that might resemble:

 

To sum up, if everything goes according to Theresa May’s plan and the polling is correct, the snap elections shouldn’t affect the Brexit negotiations too much – yet, Trump is in the White House, Marine Le Pen has a shot at the French presidency, Leicester City boasts a Premier league victory and Britain voted to leave the European Union…

Jack Brooks is a 2016 Politics and International Relations Honours Graduate of Canterbury Christ Church University and graduate coordinator at the Centre for European Studies (CEFEUS) at CCCU.

The Snap election and the risk of ‘No Scottish mandate’

On 8 June 2017 voters will be at the polls again. The Prime Minister has called a snap election in order to bolster her plan for Brexit and unite the country.

But will another election really unite the country? Highly unlikely. Polls suggest that the SNP will not lose any of the 56 seats it won in 2015. In fact, it is not entirely implausible to argue that the Conservatives, may lose their only Scottish seat. The incumbent Secretary of State for Scotland held onto his seat in 2015, but with a feeble majority of only 798 votes. This will indeed be a key target seat for the SNP, but the Tories are equally enthusiastic about usurping the Nationalists.

What happens, however, if the Conservatives win a majority of seats in England but have no seats in Scotland? This predicament, oft-described as the’ Doomsday Scenario’, is not new and was increasingly discussed during the premierships of Margaret Thatcher and John Major. If the Conservatives lose their only Scottish seat, the phrase ‘no Scottish mandate’ will once again be bandied around. It worked in the 1980s and 90s to fuel support for a Scottish parliament, might it also work to boost support for independence?

Since 2014, the SNP’s electoral juggernaut has shown very few signs of slowing down. The upcoming general election is not a referendum, but will no doubt be framed in Scotland as a dichotomous choice: Union versus Independence. The vote on June 8 has already been dubbed the ‘Brexit election’, but in Scotland the dominant issue – once again – will be independence and Indyref2.

Paul Anderson is a PhD researcher at Canterbury Christ Church University. His main research focuses on territorial autonomy and secessionist movements in western plurinational democracies.

Politics Always the Final Arbiter – The (Not So) Fixed-term Parliaments Act

The Fixed-term Parliaments Act (FTPA) passed in 2011 was meant to make the calling of early elections a lot harder for Prime Ministers. As I wrote back in July 2014, there were now several obstacles in way of a Prime Minister who wanted to go to the country early. Then the speculation was heightened as Theresa May was a new Prime Minister yet to trigger Article 50 and seemingly lacking a mandate (though there is of course no requirement for a prime ministerial mandate to govern). Now the political game has changed and the opportunity has been seized, as my colleague Sarah Lieberman writes. So what has happened to these obstacles? In effect the FTPA was a political fix not a constitutional one, meant to bind the coalition partners together after the 2010 general election. If a Prime Minister can successfully manage the process and control the narrative, as May has done, the obstacles fall away. So it is that May (catching media, cabinet colleagues, parties and the public on the hop) announced her intention to call a general election for 8 June. Demonstrating the power of the Prime Minister to set the news agenda, she controlled the media narrative placing the date pretty much in stone. Gaining parliamentary approval, now a prerequisite under the FTPA, became a formality – opposition was futile (an exercise in what we often call in political science ‘path dependency’).

The technicalities mean that when the motion is put before Parliament on Wednesday 19 April, it will require 434 MPs, two-thirds of Commons MPs, to vote in favour. Labour caught in a bind – too weak to oppose and too weak to pose an electoral threat – has indicated the party will support the motion, favouring potential electoral meltdown against blocking the Prime Minister and being accused of running scared. The politics therefore overrides the legislative technicalities. As Alan Renwick of the UCL Constitution Unit points out, the rules have proved weak in constraining a Prime Minister. Indeed, although many MPs may oppose the motion – fearful of the electoral consequences, the Act may have merely shifted the choreography from a prime ministerial trip to the palace to inform HM Queen, to a procedural vote in Parliament. Despite creeping constitutionalism, politics still remains the final arbiter in the ever vague British constitution.

Dr Mark Bennister is Reader in Politics & International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University. His research currently deals with Prime Ministerial Accountability and the Liaison Committee. In 2016, he was awarded an academic fellowship at Parliament to continue this research.

 

Theresa May’s statement – what does it mean?

A snap general election will be held on the 8th of June. According to Theresa this is to unite the people of the UK, to unite the people of Westminster. She is the ‘Brexit Candidate’. She previously said she did not want a general election, but then again she also said previously that she wished to remain in the EU.

Snap general elections should have been ended by the Fixed Term Parliament Act. However, by presenting this as the ‘democratic choice’ and presenting it to the public before asking parliament for the 60% that she requires to do this, she has cornered the opposition into a position in which they cannot refuse without looking undemocratic and undecided. Jeremy Corbyn has to say ‘yes’.

By calling the election so soon, there is very little time to organise politically. It is possible that a UKRP (UK remain party) might do well in an upcoming election. However, it is a very, very short period of time to do this. In terms of opposition, the Labour Party remains divided.

This is not a second referendum: the government is divided, the opposition is divided. The alternative position is the Liberal democrat position.  If everyone who wishes to avoid a hard Brexit votes Liberal Democrat then just maybe it could be avoided…? However, the party retains the toxic reputation of the previous General Election.

May hopes to achieve a mandate for hard Brexit, and while the Labour Party looks divided and unpopular, she lacks the opposition that would prevent her course of action. This is an opportunistic move to consolidate the power of the Conservative party, and it will be surprising if this does not happen on the 8th June.

Dr Sarah Lieberman is Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR and Canterbury Christ Church University.

Early General Election – Don’t Bet on It

Theresa-May

Dr Mark Bennister, Reader in Politics, explores the possibility of an early general election being called by the new prime minister

With British political change at present hurtling along at breakneck speed, it is reasonable to expect the unexpected. Since Theresa May became the new prime minister, speculation has increased that an early general election will be called. The reasons seem to concentrate on her criticism of Gordon Brown in 2007 as ‘running scared’ for not calling one after similarly being anointed as an unopposed party leader and prime minister. Commentators have led the calls based on her apparent need for a mandate from the electorate. This chatter has ratcheted up a notch as several opposition parties joined the chorus. There are several reasons why an early election is highly unlikely. Some of these are procedural and some political.

  1. The Fixed Term Parliament Act (FTPA), passed in 2011 sets the date of the next election as May 2020. This has taken the decision away from the prerogative powers of the prime minister and placed authority with parliament. As the UCL Constitution Unit stress, no longer is the timing of a general election in the gift of the prime minister.
  2. The FTPA stipulates the way in which a government can fall, thereby triggering an election. Either a government would need to be defeated on a motion of no-confidence or support for a dissolution of parliament would need to be demonstrated. In the first case a 14 day period is required to see if an alternative government can be formed. In the second case 60 percent of the House must support dissolution.
  3. Alternatively the FTPA could be repealed, though it is uncertain if the powers would automatically return to the prime minister. Another option, as Robert Hazell points out would be to amend the Act to specify a new date – this would require only a simple majority in the Commons and support from the Lords.
  4. The politics though make all these options highly unlikely. To use the FTPA the government would have to either engineer a no-confidence vote, and hope that everyone falls into line, or enlist the opposition parties to gain the 60 per cent necessary for a dissolution. Neither option would look particularly good and carries significant risks. With such a small current majority it would not be guaranteed that all Conservatives would support the move and why would the opposition support an election called by the government?
  5. Repealing or revising the FTPA would be more straightforward, but why bother? We elect governments not prime ministers and although Theresa May has a new team there is no requirement or imperative to call an election. After all staging the referendum was a manifesto commitment and prime ministers do frequently change in mid-term. In fact this has happened 12 times since Lloyd George. Of the post war prime ministers only Anthony Eden chose to call an election immediately after assuming office in 1955 and although he increased Conservative majority his premiership proved a disaster as the Suez crisis forced his resignation in 1957.

The structural obstacles therefore appear to mitigate against any early election. But the politics do too. With such a large in tray, the new prime minister will have enough things to sort out in the short term. Stability and a sense of control after such a turbulent period is the imperative. Although it is tempting to think the new prime minister will try and cash in on the current Labour Party disarray, why risk going to the country? A further option may be to engineer one further down the line when Brexit negotiations are concluded but again why risk it? Having swiftly changed the guard at the top such calls are likely to be resisted, particularly with the complex procedural logistics and uncertain outcome. But we are learning to expect the unexpected in British politics.